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Auditor Independence in a Private Firm  
and Low Litigation Risk Setting  
 
Abstract 
We examine the issue of auditor independence in a unique setting. Specifically, we test 
for auditor independence impairment among (1) private client firms for which the risk of 
auditor reputation loss is lower than for publicly traded firms and (2) in a low litigation 
environment (i.e., Norway) that further reduces the expected costs to the auditor 
associated with independence impairment. We have thus chosen a setting that gives 
independence impairment its best chance of being detected if it exists. Using a large 
sample of private Norwegian firms, we analyze whether auditors who receive higher fees 
are less likely to issue modified opinions. Despite the low litigation risk and the reduced 
reputation risk, our empirical results provide no evidence that auditors compromise their 
independence through fee dependence. These results are robust to including a large 
number of control variables into the model, to controlling for the expected portion of fees, 
to different sample specifications, to the use of both levels and changes specifications, 
and to a number of sensitivity analyses.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The question of auditor independence has received increased attention from regulators, 
academics, and practitioners around the world in recent years due to highly publicized audit 
failures. This is not surprising since the fact that auditors receive their fees from their client firms 
clearly creates the potential for an independence problem. Regulators argue that independence is 
compromised through an auditor’s dependence on non-audit as well as on “excessive” audit fees. 
Some academics, however, argue that regulators ignore the possibility that non-audit services 
provided by the incumbent auditor may actually improve audit quality and that regulators fail to 
consider the cost to auditors of compromising their independence. Consistent with these 
arguments, prior studies that have examined the linkage from audit/non-audit fees to auditor 
independence have been inconclusive, and in the more recent studies the case for excessive fees 
leading to impaired independence seems less than compelling (see Section II for details). These 
papers have focused on publicly traded companies in the U.S. (or similar countries). Two reasons 
put forth in the literature for why auditors maintain independence despite fee incentives to the 
contrary are that they fear lawsuits and loss of reputation. 
The purpose of this study is to examine the issue of auditor independence in an 
environment characterized by low litigation risk and low reputation risk. Specifically, we use a 
large sample of private Norwegian firms in a documented low litigation environment for audit 
firms (in contrast to more litigious environments like the U.S.), but where the overall level of 
investor protection is high.  Holding other factors constant, reducing the risk of lawsuits for 
negligence and misconduct should remove (or lessen) one of the major constraints for auditors to 
impair their independence in return for greater fees (e.g., DeAngelo 1981; Chung and Kallapur 
2003; Francis 2004). Second, prior research has shown that the risk of auditor reputation loss is 
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lower for private client firms than for publicly traded client firms (e.g., Johnstone and Bedard 
2003; Bell et al. 2002). In other words, both the low litigation environment and our use of private 
firms represent forces that work in the same direction (i.e., to reduce constraints to independence 
impairment). As a third force working in the same direction, for our going concern opinion tests 
we eliminate firms with very high likelihood of going bankrupt, as auditors are not likely to 
impair their independence for such clients (see Section III for details). Our study thus provides a 
unique context to give independence impairment tests “their best shot.” 
Using a large sample of Norwegian privately owned firms (between 17,390 and 433,176 
firm-years depending on the test), we find no evidence that fees have the negative consequences 
that regulators fear. That is, we find no evidence that auditors receiving high fees or fees in 
excess of normal (or expected) fees for audit and/or non-audit services are less likely to issue 
going concern modifications or other types of modified audit opinions. These results are robust 
to including a large number of control variables in the model, to using either abnormal fees that 
control for the expected portion of fees (using a model consisting of 21 firm-level variables as 
well as industry and year fixed effects) or raw fees, to using both association and changes tests, 
to different sample specifications and different time periods, and to a large number of sensitivity 
analyses.  
In addition to our main contribution of providing a “natural laboratory” in which to test 
auditor independence, we contribute to the literature in several other ways. First, most of the 
extant literature on auditor independence focuses on publicly listed companies, primarily in the 
U.S., the U.K., or Australia.  The majority of companies worldwide, however, are not publicly 
listed. The lack of evidence on non-publicly traded firms despite their economic importance and 
likely differences from public companies provides an interesting research opportunity. To our 
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knowledge, this is the first large-scale study of auditor independence among private firms. Our 
study thus provides some insight into the role of the external audit function for private firms that 
face different incentives than do listed firms. We believe an analysis of auditor independence in a 
private firm setting is warranted, as the role of auditors may be different in private firms, in 
which agency conflicts are generally different (due to more concentrated ownership), than in 
public firms (Coffee 2005).  
Second, one of the concerns with the prior research in this area is that data typically are 
from a single year only (e.g., Kinney and Libby 2002; Reynolds et al. 2004) and prior studies 
thus have examined associations only. Given our large sample spanning several years we are 
able to employ changes specifications which may provide more reliable inferences than basing 
conclusions on levels alone.  
Third, we have data available to investigate all deviations from a clean audit opinion. For 
ease of exposition and for comparability with recent research, most of our tabulated tests focus 
on going concern opinions. However, in additional analyses we also examine other audit 
modications. 
If we had found evidence of independence impairment, it would be difficult to know 
whether such impairment results from low litigation risk or low reputation risk (or both). 
However, despite the fact that we investigate independence impairment in a powerful setting (i.e., 
low litigation and low reputation risk environment), we detect no evidence of such impaired 
objectivity. From this we conclude that inconclusive findings in prior research cannot just be 
brushed aside as being driven by litigation or reputation concerns. Other factors likely also play a 
role. For example, the importance of ethics and professionalism is stressed in the codes of 
conduct issued by auditor associations as well as in university education leading toward the 
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professional audit examinations and in auditors’ continuing education. In general, integrity and 
independence are among the most important economic assets of audit firms, and our results 
suggest such concerns dominate any short-term financial gain auditors could obtain from 
compromising their independence. 
In the next section, we discuss related literature and describe our institutional setting.  
Section III explains the sample and the empirical models.  In sections IV and V, we discuss the 
main empirical results and results of additional analyses, respectively. Section VI explores 
potential alternative explanations. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
Auditor fees and threats to independence 
The external auditor plays a crucial role in promoting financial reporting quality, because 
auditors lend credibility to accounting information by providing independent verification of 
manager-prepared financial statements (e.g., Simunic and Stein 1987). In other words, the 
external audit potentially reduces agency costs between firms (managers) and external parties. 
However, outsiders cannot be expected to trust a company’s reported financial information 
without confidence in the auditor’s independence. 
We investigate the threats to auditor independence posed by (audit and/or non-audit) fee 
dependence. In particular, we examine whether the exercise of auditor objectivity in the 
formulation of the audit opinion is affected by the amount of fees received from the client. In 
order to issue a modified opinion, an auditor must be able to objectively evaluate firm 
performance and withstand any client pressure to issue a clean opinion (Watkins et al. 2004). 
Clearly, the fact that auditors receive their fees from their clients suggests the potential for 
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auditor independence impairment with respect to fees. A line of research, starting with DeAngelo 
(1981) and Watts and Zimmerman (1986), suggests that an auditor’s incentive to compromise 
independence relates to the economic significance of client fees. This research argues that, 
because of an economic bond, auditors concerned with the possible loss of fee revenue are more 
likely to acquiesce to clients’ wishes. DeAngelo (1981, 113) states that “the existence of client-
specific quasi-rents to incumbent auditors … lowers the optimal amount of auditor 
independence.” Survey evidence reported by Nelson et al. (2002) and Trompeter (1994) provides 
further support for this argument; the more economically dependent the auditor is on the client, 
the more likely the auditor is to succumb to client pressure. 
Notwithstanding these arguments, the relation between audit remuneration and auditors 
sacrificing their independence is theoretically ambiguous. The reason is that the auditors do not 
only consider the benefit of higher expected fees when compromising their objectivity, but also 
the expected costs of audit failures. In particular, it is often argued that costs related to the loss of 
reputation and litigation reduce the incentives for auditors to compromise their independence 
(DeAngelo 1981; Simunic 1984; Chung and Kallapur 2003). Specifically, if the auditor 
acquiesces to her client and damages her reputation, she potentially loses fees from other current 
and future clients (and/or faces lawsuits). Thus, based on these conflicting arguments, it is not 
surprising that the extant research on whether auditors compromise their independence through 
fee dependence provides mixed evidence. 
Although the extant research has focused on reputation effects and expected lawsuits as 
the primary reasons why auditors may refrain from compromising their independence, 
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professional ethics likely also play a role.1 According to the International Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC Section 100.1), a distinguishing mark of the accountancy profession is its 
acceptance of the responsibility to act in the public interest. We return to the importance of this 
dimension is Section VI. 
 
Auditor fees and impaired auditor independence 
Most of the prior empirical literature tests the relation between fees and some measure of 
earnings management or accruals quality (and/or the likelihood of meeting or beating earnings 
targets). Consistent with DeAngelo’s (1981) arguments, Gul et al. (2003) find a positive 
association between discretionary accruals and audit fees in Australia, and Frankel et al. (2002) 
find a positive relation between the provision of non-audit services and measures of earnings 
management in the U.S. (see also Ahmed et al. 2006 and Choi et al. 2006). However, subsequent 
studies have criticized the findings and interpretations of Frankel et al. For example, after 
controlling for firm performance, Ashbaugh et al. (2003) find that there is no longer a positive 
relation between non-audit fees and abnormal accruals (see also Chung and Kallapur 2003; 
Larcker and Richardson 2004; Reynolds et al. 2004).  
As an alternative to testing auditor fee dependence using accrual measures, we focus on 
the auditor’s propensity to issue going concern (or other modified) audit opinions. Such an 
investigation may provide a more direct test of auditor independence than research investigating 
earnings management. First, the literature has documented the difficulties associated with 
measuring discretionary accruals (e.g., Hribar and Collins 2002; Reynolds et al. 2004; Dopuch et 
al. 2007). Second, in contrast to the indirect influence of auditors on earnings characteristics, the 
                                               
1
 According to Frankel (1989, 114), a profession’s code of ethics is perhaps its most visible and explicit enunciation 
of its professional norms. In particular, the code embodies the collective conscience of a profession and is testimony 
to the group’s recognition of its moral dimension. 
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auditor directly influences the type of audit opinion, and measuring the audit opinion is 
unambiguous (DeFond et al. 2002).2 
Prior research provides mixed evidence on the relation between fees and modified audit 
opinions. On the one hand, DeFond et al. (2002) examine the relation between audit and non-
audit fees and the issuance of a going concern audit opinion - one of the most severe audit 
modifications. Using a sample of 1,158 financially distressed publicly listed U.S. firms in 2001-
2002, they find no association between fees and impaired auditor independence. They attribute 
their results to auditors’ concerns over the loss of reputation and litigation costs, and argue that 
these costs dominate the expected benefits from compromising auditor independence. Craswell 
et al. (2002) report similar findings for a sample of Australian firms. In contrast to these findings, 
Wines (1994) and Basioudis et al. (2008) report results consistent with independence impairment 
using small samples of Australian and U.K. firms, respectively.   
Following research by Wines (1994), Barkess and Simnett (1994), Craswell (1999), 
DeFond et al. (2002), and Craswell et al. (2002), in this study we assume that auditors with 
impaired independence will be less likely to issue going concern (or other modified) opinions 
when such opinions are warranted. Specifically, we test whether auditor fees are inversely 
related to auditors’ propensity to issue modified audit opinions. We now turn to discussing our 
setting: privately owned firms in a low litigation environment (i.e., Norway).  
 
Private firms and institutional setting 
Empirical research on the possible consequences of compromised auditor independence 
is dominated by (but not limited entirely to) research on publicly listed U.S., Australian, or U.K. 
                                               
2
 In part motivated by the problems introduced by relying on accrual quality models, Hope et al. (2009a) focus on 
investors’ perceptions of auditor independence, as reflected in their required rate of return on equity capital. 
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firms. We are not aware of any studies that analyze whether the Anglo-Saxon evidence on audit 
quality for public companies generalizes to other countries with different legal systems and in 
particular, to non-common law countries with less ability to sue auditors for negligence and 
misconduct (Francis 2004). In this study, we empirically investigate the potential for fee 
dependence to affect auditors’ willingness to issue modified audit opinions in non-publicly 
traded firms. In spite of their economic importance and likely differences from public companies, 
little is known about financial reporting by private firms (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). In 
particular, there is limited research on the role of auditing for private firms. Coffee (2001; 2005) 
argues that the role of the auditor may be different in private firms than in public firms because 
of private firms’ higher ownership concentration, and in particular because these firms often 
have controlling shareholders. This means that the agency costs relate relatively more to a 
controlling shareholder versus minority shareholder conflict rather than a manager versus 
shareholders conflict.3  
It is not obvious whether external auditors play a lesser or a stronger role in private firms 
than in public firms. On the one hand, Coffee (2005) discusses how the existence of controlling 
shareholders can affect auditor independence. That is, Coffee argues that it is difficult for the 
auditor to escape the control of the party that she is expected to monitor. On the other hand, 
Lennox (2005) posits that the monitoring value of auditing may be higher in private firms 
because they are less vulnerable to takeovers and because they are required to disclose less 
accounting and non-accounting information than public firms. 
This study may thus enhance our understanding of private firms, which are predominant 
in the economy in most countries. To illustrate this point, Berzins et al. (2008) analyze all 
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 Just like for public firms, suppliers, customers, employees, and (perhaps especially) lenders likely find the 
auditors’ function useful for private firms. 
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limited liability firms in Norway during the 1994-2005 period and report that more than 99% 
were not listed on a stock exchange. They further show that (in aggregate) nonlisted firms have 
about four times more employees than listed firms, have three times higher revenues, and twice 
the amount of assets. They further provide indirect evidence suggesting that the relative 
importance of nonlisted firms in Norway is representative for most countries in the world. 
Related to auditing of private firms, there are millions of small and medium sized corporations in 
Europe with audited annual reports (Pacter 2004) and private firms make up a significant portion 
of the market for audit services (Chaney et al. 2004).  
Although the above reasons to examine private firms are important, for the purpose of 
our study, of even greater importance is the fact that private firm clients are widely regarded as 
being of lower reputation risk to auditors than public clients (e.g., Clatworthy and Peel 2007; 
Johnstone and Bedard 2003, 2004; Bell et al. 2002; Lys and Watts 1994; Palmrose 1986; St. 
Pierre and Anderson 1984). In other words, the reputation risk is lower for our sample of private 
firms than for the samples of public firms typically examined in the literature.  
There are several reasons why Norway provides a unique environment in which to study 
auditor independence. First and most importantly, consistent with the statements of Francis 
(2004), Norway is a low litigation environment compared with the U.S.4 Between 1945 and 2005 
the total number of court cases against auditors is 40. Only 12 of the cases were related to annual 
statements and the audit report (and the auditor was convicted in only three cases). Equally 
important, since all court cases prior to 1996 had been published and discussed in the widely 
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 According to DeFond and Francis (2005, 13), “… there is an urgent need to better understand the role of legal 
liability in achieving audit quality and whether the kind of extreme  litigation exposure we have in the U.S. is really 
necessary to achieve an appropriate level of audit quality.” Note that we do not argue that there is no regulatory 
oversight in Norway; rather our argument is based on significantly lower expected litigation costs than in the U.S. 
The authors have conducted an extensive review of the regulatory environment in Norway. For reasons of brevity 
that analysis is not included with this study but is available from the authors upon request. 
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read professional magazine Revisjon og Regnskap (“Accounting and Auditing,” various issues) 
and in Grønn et al. (1996), it was common knowledge among auditors at the start of our sample 
period that there had been very few court cases against auditors.5 The number of court cases 
appears small compared with a total of 5,154 authorized auditors and 514 authorized audit firms 
in Norway in 2003, and approximately 1.6 million audited financial statements during the 1994-
2004 period.6 
The lower litigation risk, combined with our focus on private firms with lower reputation 
risk, suggests that we have created the “perfect storm” in which to test for auditor independence 
impairment. Since both low litigation and low reputation risk represent forces that work in the 
same direction, if we want to study independence in a real world setting in which independence 
impairment is most likely to occur, our setting provides a powerful test. 
                                               
5
 Source: Grønn et al. (1996) supplemented with our own research using the legal database lovdata.no. Grønn et al. 
(1996), which contains all court cases against auditors during the years 1945-1996, was published by the Norwegian 
Institute of Public Accountants and the court cases had also been discussed in Revisjon og Regnskap (“Accounting 
and Auditing”). 11 out of the 12 cases that are concerned with topics relevant for this study took place between 1987 
and 1995, and the last case took place in 2003. We eliminate bankruptcy candidates from our sample since auditors 
have few or no incentives to impair their independence for these firms (see Section III for details). 
6
 The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSAN) licenses and supervises auditors and takes disciplinary 
actions against auditors when deemed necessary. During the years 1994-2005, the yearly average of auditors and 
audit firms under supervision of FSAN numbered about 5,000. Primarily for statistical purposes, FSAN has 
document-based inspections that cover all auditors. In addition, based on complaints received against auditors or 
where signs of shortcomings are evident (e.g., “.. auditors with few assignments owing to age” or auditors “who 
have failed to keep up with the trend in sound auditing practices through refresher training, memberships in the 
auditor’s association, or the like” (FSAN, Annual Report 1995: 26)), FSAN has on-site inspections. On-site 
inspections means that FSAN assesses “… of the appropriateness of auditing methods, whether the scope of audit 
procedures is sufficient, whether the auditor’s assessments and conclusions accord with the result of the audit 
procedures and whether satisfactory supporting documentation for the audit is available” (FSAN Annual Report 
2002: 42). During the years 1994-2005, the yearly average of on-site inspections (complaints received) was 113 
(44.6), resulting in a yearly average of 7.4 licenses being withdrawn (FSAN Annual Report, various issues). These 
numbers include FSAN’s investigations of auditors reported to FSAN by liquidators of bankrupt firms (see also 
footnote 11).  
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Second, financial statements filed by Norwegian private firms must be audited.7 The 
auditing environment in Norway is otherwise similar to that in other Western European countries 
(Eilifsen 1998).  
Third, firms have been required to disclose auditor fees (i.e., audit and non-audit fees 
separately) in the annual report since 1990 (as per the Accounting Act paragraphs 7-31A/7-44 
and the Auditor Act paragraph 5-3). Our data providers have collected information on total 
remuneration to auditors (i.e., the sum of audit and non-audit fees) since 1996 and on audit and 
non-audit fees separately for the 1997 – 2002 period. Consequently, in contrast to the small 
samples used in most previous research, we can use large samples over several years.  
The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway (FSAN) and the Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance made regulatory changes in 2003 and 2005 that tighten the rules regarding the types of 
non-audit services that can be offered by the audit firm to the audit client. To our knowledge, the 
decisions in Norway to restrict non-audit services were not based on research. As Simunic 
(1984) points out, hiring the auditor to perform non-audit services may benefit firms due to 
“knowledge spillovers,” whereby client-specific information that the auditor gains while 
performing non-audit services is used to enhance the quality of the audit. This could be 
especially relevant for private firms. Compared with listed companies, private firms are typically 
small and may have less expertise internally and therefore have a greater demand for services 
that auditors provide. In addition, these firms often face higher costs of obtaining non-audit 
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 Similar to the rest of Europe, Norway’s accounting regulation is primarily based on a firm’s legal form, rather than 
its listing status. Specifically, the Norwegian Accounting Act requires all private and public limited liability 
companies to file annual financial statements that comply with the same accounting standards (with some minor 
exceptions as explained later), and these statements are made publicly available. Furthermore, private and public 
companies are subject to the same tax laws and other company regulations. To our knowledge, Sweden is the only 
other country where all limited liability firms are required to be audited. In both countries there is currently a 
regulatory debate over whether the smallest private firms should be exempt from the audit requirement. 
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services from independent consultants due to their geographic location (i.e., they are often 
located outside of urban centers).8  
 
III. SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample 
We obtain data on audit and non-audit fees from D&B Norge AS, the Norwegian 
subsidiary of Dun & Bradstreet. All other data are from Experian AS. We merge data using the 
company organizational number (a unique identifier). 
In our main tests we report results for two sample periods: 1997-2002 and 2001-2002. 
The former sample spans more years and is thus larger and more representative. However, the 
latter sample contains data on five potentially important control variables that are unavailable in 
earlier years: who the auditor is, whether there has been a switch in auditor, auditor industry 
specialization, the number of subsidiaries, and the percentage of foreign subsidiaries. We end our 
sample period in 2002 because, even though fee disclosure continues to be required after 2002, 
our data provider stopped reporting audit and non-audit fees separately in 2003. In additional 
analyses we report results through 2005 using only total fees. Please note that in the Appendix 
we provide definitions for all variables used (and hence we do not repeat all definitions in the 
text). 
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 According to a speech by Head of the Auditing Section of FSAN (Elvestad 2006), the most common services 
provided to private firms by audit firms include assistance with taxes and other duties, assistance with complex 
accounting rules, assistance with cost-benefit analyses, help with development of internal routines and controls, and 
assistance with restructuring, M&A, and ownership transitions. With respect to regulation of non-audit services, The 
Norwegian Act on Auditing and Auditor prohibits the auditor from providing management functions to the audit 
client or act as principal for the client. In addition to the legal requirements, the Norwegian Institute of Public 
Accountants issues recommendation for its members on matters such as the provision of non-audit services to audit 
clients. For example, the auditor should not make decisions on behalf of the audit client, provide valuation services, 
or perform bookkeeping services. Since 2003 the regulation of the provision of non-audit services to audit clients 
has been significantly tightened. 
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Table 1 summarizes our sample selection criteria. Our starting point is all private limited 
liability firms in Norway. Since many of these firms are very small, we exclude firms with less 
than 1 million Norwegian krone (NOK) in sales revenue or total assets as well as firms with total 
auditor fees less than NOK 10,000.9,10 We further remove firms for which we do not have data 
available for audit opinions or other variables used in our tests, and following prior research we 
exclude financial firms.  
For tests of audit modifications other than going concern we employ the full sample of 
firms. However, for going concern opinions, we restrict our sample to “moderately distressed 
firms” (Mutchler et al. 1997; Reynolds and Francis 2000; DeFond et al. 2002). The sample 
should exclude the most extremely distressed companies as auditors likely would have little 
incentive to not issue going concern opinions for such firms.11 We employ two approaches. First, 
we exclude firms that exit the sample during the two-year period following our test period (an ex 
post criterion). Second, we use the Ohlson (1980) bankruptcy prediction model to identify firms 
that are in risk of facing bankruptcy (an ex ante criterion). We form 20 equally-sized portfolios 
based on the probability of bankruptcy and we eliminate the portfolio with the highest 
bankruptcy score from the analysis.12 We further eliminate the bottom 12 portfolios (or 60%) as 
                                               
9
 This exclusion criterion ensures that we do not include a number of “shell companies” that have little economic 
activity and few if any employees. To illustrate this point, these very small excluded firms have a mean (median) 
number of employees of 1.83 (1). The average exchange rate between NOK and USD during our sample period was 
7.49. 
10
 We later report result of sensitivity analyses in which we (1) apply more stringent size criteria so that we exclude 
more small firms, (2) report results for size quartiles separately, (3) focus only on client firms that are the most 
important in terms of fees, and (4) report results separately for Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. 
11
 It is well known to auditors that liquidators, in accordance with the Bankruptcy Act paragraph 120, investigate the 
auditor’s work prior to bankruptcy. About two thirds of all court cases against auditors in Norway are preceded by 
bankruptcies or debt negotiations between the client and its creditors. For court cases related to annual reports and 
audit reports, 10 out of the 12 cases in the 1945-2005 period were preceded by bankruptcies or debt negotiations.  
Unrelated to legal issues but working in the same direction, auditors cannot expect any futures fees from bankruptcy 
candidates. 
12
 Note that by eliminating firms that are most likely to go bankrupt (based on both ex ante and ex post measures), 
we have further added to the “perfect storm” described earlier in that we have removed the cases for which auditors 
are most likely to be sued should they not provide a going concern opinion. In other words, this research design 
14 
these firms do not face any serious risk of going out of business. Our sample consists of 42,296 
(1997-2002) and 17,390 (2000-2001) firm-year observations from portfolios 13-19 of 
moderately distressed firms. In Section V we report results of using an alternative approach to 
identifying distressed firms. Table 2 shows that this approach sorts firms in an intuitive way: 
There is a monotonic increase in the percent of going concern opinions when going from 
portfolio one to portfolio 20. Similarly, other audit modifications also increase, and the percent 
of clean audit opinions is strictly decreasing across portfolios. In addition, the fraction of firms 
that exit the sample is also increasing with the probability of bankruptcy, consistent with the 
bankruptcy prediction model sorting firms correctly. (An exception is the first group which also 
has a quite high exit rate; this is likely caused by these firms being highly profitable and thus 
likely take-over targets.) 
 
Logistic regression model 
Our main tests examine the effects of (abnormal) audit and non-audit fees on the 
probability of issuing going concern opinions (either in an explanatory paragraph or as a 
disclaimer of opinion), possibly the most serious audit modification provided. In additional 
analyses, we study auditors’ propensity to issue any other form of modified audit opinions.  
Since most of the extant research in this area has relied on association tests, we employ 
these tests to ease comparison with prior studies. However, we also employ changes tests that are 
potentially better specified than association tests. The following paragraphs describe the 
association tests, but the changes tests include the same variables in changes form (please see 
notes to Table 6). We estimate the following logit regression that models the auditor’s propensity 
                                                                                                                                                       
choice is consistent with our choice of a low litigation risk environment and client firms with low (or reduced) 
reputation risk. 
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to issue a going concern audit opinion, controlling for a large number of variables that prior 
research has shown to potentially affect this decision (subscripts for firm and year omitted).  
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   (1) 
 
GC is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for going concern modified audit 
opinions (zero otherwise). FEE is either total auditor fees (audit plus non-audit fees), audit fees 
or non-audit fees separately, or audit and non-audit fees included jointly.13 The notion of fee 
dependence refers to the extent to which the auditor is influenced by unusually high (or low) fees. 
However, since there is no consensus in the literature as to whether abnormal or raw fees best 
capture “economic bonding” between auditors and their clients, in this study we employ both 
measures. We describe our abnormal fee model in the next section. Regulators have shown 
concern that auditors are willing to sacrifice their independence in exchange for retaining clients 
that pay lucrative consulting and other non-audit fees (e.g. Levitt 2000; Aamo 2002). But based 
on the argument that fee dependence is inherent in auditor-client contracting and that both fees 
could create similar incentives to the auditor (e.g., Hansen and Watts 1997; Reynolds and 
Francis 2000), we examine the effects of non-audit as well as audit fees. Specifically, our tests 
include either total fees, audit fees or non-audit fees included separately, or audit and non-audit 
fees included jointly. 
                                               
13
 The specification with both audit and non-audit fees included in effect estimates the effect of one fee variable on 
the propensity to issue modified opinions while controlling for the effect of the other fee variable. This may be 
important as Whisenant et al. (2003) provide empirical evidence that audit and non-audit fees are simultaneously 
determined. 
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The control variables are based on prior research and are intended to control for the 
impact of client firm size, complexity, risk, and mitigating factors on auditors’ decisions to 
qualify or modify their opinions (e.g., Craswell et al. 2002; Frankel et al. 2002; DeFond et al. 
2002). We use firm size (LNTA) to control for the impact client size can have on the propensity 
to be independent. We control for firm age (LNAGE) since younger firms are more prone to 
failure and have less experience with accounting controls. Leverage (LEV) controls for the level 
of financial risk, and the change in leverage (ChLEV) controls for changes in financial risk. To 
control for operating risk and the probability of bankruptcy, we use cash flow from operations 
(OPCF), an indicator variable for accounting loss (LOSS), and return on assets (ROA).  
We add investments in liquid assets (INVESTMENTS) as a liquidity measure following 
DeFond et al. (2002). Although we exclude the lowest 12 and the highest Ohlson portfolio 
groups, there is likely still considerable variation in the likelihood of bankruptcy within the 
sample, and consequently we include the Ohlson bankruptcy prediction variable (PROBANK) as 
a control variable. We further control for increases in shareholders’ equity and debt in both the 
current and next period (INCPIC, NEWDEBT, FUTINCPIC, and FUTNEWDEBT) as mitigating 
factors (e.g., Mutchler et al. 1997).  
We include auditor size (BIG4) to capture the impact audit quality could have on the 
exercise of professional judgment. We also control for change in audit firm (ChAUD) as an 
indicator of client firm risk and potential effects on audit report modifications (Lennox 2000). As 
described above, BIG4 and ChAUD are only available for the 2001-2002 sample period. Since 
going concern opinions tend to be sticky, we control for the existence of a prior-year going 
concern modification (GCPY). An alternative approach, which yields consistent results, is to 
only include firms which receive a modified opinion for the first time. We add industry controls 
17 
(two-digit SIC industry indicators) in order to account for systematic differences in the riskiness 
or complexity of the audit function across industries. Finally, we include time period (YR) to 
control for possible shifts in the propensity to issue modified opinions over time.  
In addition to association tests, we also employ changes tests which are potentially better 
specified to document a causal relation between fees and the likelihood of not issuing modified 
opinions than association tests alone. Furthermore, changes tests represent a useful additional test 
specification as results are less likely to be affected by potential correlated omitted variables, as 
we in effect use the firm as its own control. They may also be useful in addressing possible 
endogeneity concerns, especially in conjunction with the use of abnormal fee models that control 
for the expected amount of fees. 
We employ two specifications of changes tests. In the first, the dependent variable is 
coded as one if the audit opinion is modified and if there was no modification in the previous 
year. The independent variables represent changes from the previous year. In the second test, the 
dependent variable is defined as one if next year’s audit opinion is modified and there was no 
modification in the previous year. 
 
Abnormal (or unexpected) fee model 
To control for the expected component of audit and non-audit fees, we compute excess 
auditor remuneration following prior research (e.g., Frankel et al. 2002; DeFond et al. 2002; 
Choi et al. 2005; Hope et al. 2009a). In particular, we want to control for normal fees charged by 
the auditor for a given level of effort and risk. We regress the log of auditor fee measures on two 
audit-firm variables and 19 client-firm variables, as well as year and industry fixed effects, and 
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use the residuals from these regressions as our proxy for abnormal fees. 
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For our 2001-2002 sample, we include an indicator variable for Big 4 audit firm (BIG4) 
because large audit firms offer more insurance for the client (e.g., Dye 1993) and provide higher 
quality audits (e.g., Becker et al. 1998). DeAngelo (1981) notes that the ability of an auditor to 
detect material error in the financial statements is a function of auditor competence, and auditors 
that specialize in an industry are likely to be more competent. We therefore control for auditor 
industry specialization by adding INDSPEC as control variable.14  
The remainder of the instruments are employed in both the 1997-2002 and 2001-2002 
samples. Given the importance of firm size in explaining auditor fees, we include two size-based 
explanatory variables: the log of sales revenues (LNSALES) and the log of number of employees 
(LNEMPLOY).15 To further control for variations in client firm characteristics, we include the 
change in financial leverage during the year (ChLEV), investments in securities and cash 
equivalents (INVESTMENTS), inventories and accounts receivable (INVREC), percentage growth 
in sales (GROWTH), return on assets (ROA), acquisitions (ACQUISITIONS), intangible asset 
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 The sample used to calculate INDSPEC consists of all audited firms in 2001 and 2002 with available information 
on industry affiliation and auditor identification. No inferences are affected if we instead measure INDSPEC by 
clients’ revenue (i.e., the sum of revenue of all clients an auditor has in a particular industry divided by total revenue 
of all firms in that industry). 
15
 Given the concern in the audit literature about the effects of size nonlinearities, we have considered adding either 
the square root of sales or the square of sales to the model. As an alternative we have run the test adding an 
interaction term between LNSALES and all other instruments. Finally, we have run the model separately for different 
size quartiles (see Section V). No inferences are affected with these alternative specifications. The size variables are 
obviously positively correlated (the correlation coefficients between TA and SALES (TA and EMPLOY) [SALES and 
EMPLOY] is 0.43 (0.21) [0.38]) and some of the other variables also exhibit significant correlations. However, 
consistent with prior literature we are primarily interested in obtaining a model with reasonable fit. In any case, 
variance inflation factors and condition indices do not suggest the presence of serious multicollinearity. 
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intensity (INTANG), an indicator variable for the presence of unusual or extraordinary items 
(UNITEMS), and an indicator variable equal to one if the firm uses regular GAAP and zero if the 
firm uses “simplified GAAP” for small firms (GAAP).  
To control for efforts and risks related to capital structure changes (over and above what 
is captured by ChLEV), we include indicator variables for increase or decrease in paid-in capital 
and for issuance of new interest-bearing debt (INCPIC, DECPIC, and NEWDEBT, respectively) 
and we control for current ratio effects (CURRATIO).16 
To further capture factors related to firm complexity, we include the log of the number of 
subsidiaries (LNSUB), the percentage of foreign subsidiaries (FOREIGN), the number of distinct 
two-digit SIC code industries the firm operates in (NOIND), and an indicator variable for 
whether the firm has a fiscal year different from the calendar year (FYE). 
Finally, we control for both time period (year) and industry affiliation (controlling for 
potential industry variation in complexity and litigation risk) through indicator variables for two-
digit SIC codes. We estimate Equation (2) and use the error term (υ) as our measure of abnormal 
fees.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in our main regression 
(Equation 1) as well as in the computation of abnormal fees (Equation 2). With the exception of 
BIG4, ChAUD, INDSPEC, NOSUBS (the raw number of LNSUBS), and FOREIGN, for 
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 To reduce the potential impact of extreme observations, we winsorize ChLEV, OPCF, ROA, INVESTMENTS, 
INVREC, GROWTH, and CURRATIO at the 1% and 99% of their distributions (and LEV at 99%). We have also 
considered commonly used procedures such as to delete the top and bottom one percent of the independent variables. 
No inferences are affected by outlier removal choices. 
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simplicity we report these descriptive statistics based on the 1997-2002 sample. The table shows 
that 8% of our sample of financially distressed firms received a going concern modification. The 
mean total fees, audit fees, and non-audit fees are 45, 28, and 18 (rounding) thousand NOK, 
respectively. Not surprisingly, the sample firms are small (with mean total assets of 15 million 
NOK), relatively young (mean age of 13 years), and frequently reporting accounting losses 
(mean of 37%). Big 4 auditors are employed by 29% of the firms and 16% changed auditors 
during the year. 
 
Results of estimation of abnormal fees 
Table 4 presents the OLS regression results of estimating Equation 2 for the 1997-2002 
(Panel A) and 2001-2002 sample (Panel B). Reported significance levels for these and 
subsequent tests are two-sided and based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
The adjusted R2s are 52-54% for audit and total fees and 28-31% for non-audit fees. As predicted, 
auditor remuneration (i.e., both audit and non-audit fees) is significantly positively associated 
with the two firm size variables LNSALES and LNEMPLOY. Consistent with expectations, fees 
are further significantly positively related to INVESTMENTS, INVREC, ACQUISITIONS, 
INTANG, UNITEMS,  GAAP, INCPIC, DECPIC, NEWDEBT, NOIND, FYE, BIG4, and LNSUB, 
and negatively correlated with ROA. As explained above, our model also incorporates year and 
industry fixed effects (not shown in table).  
 
Logit regression results  
Table 5 presents the results of estimating Equation (1) for the two sample periods and for 
both abnormal and raw fees. For brevity we do not tabulate the control variables when reporting 
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the results for raw fees. Most importantly, across all 16 estimations, the abnormal fee variables 
are not negatively associated with auditors’ propensity to issue a going concern opinion. More 
specifically, Panels A1 and B1 show that abnormal auditor fees are not significantly related to 
the likelihood of issuing going concern opinions. In other words, after controlling for effort and 
risk components of auditor fees, we find that the level of auditor fee dependence does not affect 
auditor propensity to modify their audit opinions.  
In Panel A2 we see that several of the coefficients on raw fees are significantly positive.17 
However, in Panel B2, which includes the additional control variables, the estimated coefficients 
for raw fees are no longer statistically significant. Based on the results in Table 5, there is thus no 
evidence supporting the contention that fee dependence leads to lower independence and hence a 
reduced probability of issuing a going concern opinion. 
The control variables generally have the predicted signs. Larger, more mature (i.e., 
“older”), and more profitable firms, as well as firms that have increased their share capital, are 
less likely to receive a modified opinion. More highly levered firms and firms with losses and 
prior-year going concern opinions are more likely to receive a modified opinion. The future 
financing variables (FUTINCPIC and FUTNEWDEBT) are positive and significant (except 
FUTNEWDEBT in Panel B1), indicating that firms with going concern modification are able or 
forced to raise more capital in the future than otherwise equally troubled firms without going 
concern modifications.18,19 
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 This finding is not surprising since, when companies experience financial problems (which lead to a going 
concern opinion), it is likely that additional audit effort is required. As the cost of auditing increases, ceteris paribus, 
the measured dependence on fees mechanically increases (e.g., Craswell et al. 2002). In our view, this line of 
arguments suggests the need to either explicitly control for effort and risk when measuring fees (i.e., using abnormal 
fees) or testing whether increases in fees are related to a lower propensity of receiving a modified opinion the same 
year or in subsequent years (as we do below). 
18
 In Panel A1, firms that increase their leverage have lower propensity to receive going concern opinions. These 
results do not hold in Panel B1. In Panel A1 the coefficient on OPCF is positive and significant. This is not the case 
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We report results of the two changes specifications for both abnormal and raw fees and 
for the two sample periods in Table 6. For brevity we only report the test variables in these and 
subsequent tests. Specifically, in Table 6 all control variables are included in the estimation and 
are also measured in changes. Consistent with the association tests, none of the estimated 
coefficients are negative and significant. Thus, we find no evidence that higher fees lead to a 
lower propensity to issue modified audit opinions. These results complement and strengthen the 
conclusions drawn from our association tests. 
To summarize the findings from Tables 5 and 6, we do not observe any evidence that 
auditor fee dependence is associated with reduced auditor independence with respect to issuing 
modified audit opinions and thus we find no indication that auditors abuse their trust. Recall that 
we selected our sample with the idea of “giving independence impairment its best chance of 
being detected.” Specifically, we focus on the private firm market which has lower reputation 
risk for auditors. Second, we examine independence in an environment characterized by low 
litigation risk. In addition, we exclude firms that are the most likely to go bankrupt. In other 
words, even in a setting in which these important forces should work to reduce the constraints on 
auditors, there is no evidence that (large) fees received from clients translate into a lower 
likelihood of issuing modified audit opinions. We provide further discussion of results in Section 
VI.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
in Panel B1 that includes the additional control variables. When we exclude LOSS and ROA from the model (since 
these variables capture similar dimensions), the significance of OPCF disappears also in Panel A1. 
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 From Panel B1 we see that ChAUD is not significant. As an alternative control, we have excluded firms that 
changed auditors during the year and rerun the tests. No inferences are affected. Our main equation includes a 
control for change in auditors during the year. We have also considered including this variable in the fee model. 
Untabulated analyses show that auditor change is positively and significantly (not significantly) related to total fees 
and audit fees (non-audit fees). 
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V. ADDITIONAL TESTS20 
Results for most recent time period using total fees 
As explained previously, after 2002 we do not have data on audit and non-audit fees 
separately, but we do have data on total fees. Given that the media has focused more on auditor 
independence issues in recent years than in the past, and because of recent changes in auditor 
legislation described above, we test whether inferences are the same for the more recent 2003-
2005 period. Consistent with prior results, Panel A of Table 7 shows no significant association 
between fees and going concern-modified opinions during recent years. 
 
Other audit modifications 
For brevity and for ease of comparison with prior research (e.g., DeFond et al. 2002), our 
main tests have centered on going concern modifications and financially distressed firms. To 
check if (large) fees negatively impact auditors’ likelihood of issuing audit modifications other 
than going concern opinions, we repeat the tests using several alternative modifications as 
dependent variables (without requiring that firms be classified as financially distressed). 
Experian has categorized deviations from a clean audit report into 12 categories in addition to the 
going concern opinion. Thus, one of the advantages of our data set is that we have detailed data 
on exactly what type of audit modifications was issued. We group the 12 categories into three 
clusters based on the Norwegian Auditing Standard RS 700 (which follows ISA 700) and repeat 
our tests. These categories are, from least to most serious, “clarifications” (i.e. unqualified 
opinions with emphasis of matter), “reservations” (i.e. modified opinions due to limitations with 
respect to scope or disagreements with management), and unable to issue an opinion (i.e., 
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 For brevity we only report results using abnormal fees in Table 7. Inferences are not affected if we instead use raw 
fees. 
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substantial limitations with respect to scope/disclaimer of opinion). In Panels B and C of Table 7, 
we present the results using association tests and changes tests, respectively. As the table shows, 
there is no indication of impaired independence when examining these other audit modifications. 
Specifically, across the nine regressions reported, there is no case of significantly negative 
coefficients (and only two of the 19 estimated coefficients on fees are significantly positive). In 
other words, our inferences are not just limited to going concern opinions for financially 
distressed firms but rather extend to other forms of audit report modifications. 
 
Other sensitivity analyses  
In addition to the various specifications tested above, in the following we report results of 
numerous additional sensitivity tests. We (1) repeat the tests without imposing the constraint that 
firms be defined as financially distressed and have positive non-audit fees, (2) employ an 
alternative approach to classifying firms as financially distressed for going concern tests, (3) test 
for subsamples of Big 4 versus non-Big 4 auditors, (4) analyze a subsample of firms that likely 
are most important to the auditor in terms of fees, (5) use subsamples based on client firm size, 
(6) use the non-audit fee ratio, (7) analyze firms with positive abnormal fees only, and (8) add 
firm-level governance variables as controls. The results of these tests are not tabulated for 
brevity, but are available from the authors upon request.  
We first repeat both our association and change tests using a much larger sample of firms. 
Specifically, we no longer impose the requirement that firms be financially distressed and have 
positive non-audit fees. This means we have up to 433,176 observations spanning 10 years 
(1996-2005). 
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As there is no theoretically correct way of defining “financially distressed,” as an 
alternative to using the Ohlson model to sort firms, as our second sensitivity test we follow 
Reynolds and Francis (2000) and DeFond et al. (2002) and focus on firms with negative net 
income or negative operating cash flow in the current year. For these tests our sample consists of 
46,762 (1997-2002) and 19,349 (2001-2002) firm-year observations, respectively.  
Although we control for Big 4 auditor in our reported tests, as an alternative approach 
(and our third robustness check) we estimate the tests separately for non-Big 4 and Big 4 samples. 
It is conceivable that the independence threat could vary between these two groups of audit firms.  
Since it is possible that auditors’ incentives to compromise independence are related to 
client importance, our fourth test focuses on the most important clients (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986; DeAngelo 1981). Specifically, the overall sample fee magnitude reported in Table 3 is 
NOK 45,280, and it could be that this amount is too small to cause a meaningful economic bond. 
First, following Chung and Kallapur (2003), we use fees to construct measures of client 
importance. Client importance is measured as the ratio of a client’s total fees to the audit firm’s 
total fees from all clients, the ratio of client’s audit fee to the audit firm’s total fees from all 
clients, or the ratio of client’s non-audit fees to the audit firm’s total fees from all clients. We 
then run the tests on a subset of firms consisting of the ten percent of firms that have highest 
scores on each of the three client importance variables. We also run tests on the subset of client 
firms that have the have highest fees (as NOK 200,000 in fees from one client is presumably 
more important than NOK 20,000 from 10 clients). Specifically, we analyze a subset of firms for 
which total, audit, or non-audit fees are above the 90th percentile of total, audit, or non-audit fee 
respectively. The mean total fee for this subsample is NOK 177,350 (4.2 times larger than for the 
full sample of firms), which seems economically important to most audit firms in Norway. 
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Despite the fact that we include several controls for size in our tests, it is possible that our 
size controls are inadequate. In our fifth test, we create subsamples of firms based on total assets 
(TA). First we remove the smallest firms from our sample, as these firms may be of least interest 
in a non-Norwegian context and when comparing our results with those of publicly traded firms 
or private firms in other countries where mandatory auditing is required but only when a size 
threshold is exceeded. Specifically, we exclude the first quartile of firms in terms of TA and 
rerun our tests. Second, we group all firms into four equal-sized subsets based on TA and rerun 
the tests for each of the size groups. Finally, we group firms into two subsets depending on 
whether they use regular GAAP or simplified GAAP and rerun the tests for each subset. 
In the sixth test, as a specification check on our tests on the effect of non-audit fee 
dependence, we also considered non-audit fee ratio (instead of including the audit and non-audit 
fees jointly). 
According to Choi et al. (2006) and Hope et al. (2009a), economic bonding between the 
client and audit firm is less likely to occur for any level of negative abnormal fees. Consequently, 
in the seventh sensitivity test we run all tests using only the subsample with positive abnormal 
fees.  
Although our models already include numerous control variables, in our final test we 
further add control variables related to firm-level corporate governance issues (e.g., Larcker and 
Richardson 2004; Coffee 2005). In particular, we control for firm ownership percentage by the 
CEO, whether the CEO is also the chairman of the board, government ownership, and foreign 
ownership. 
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In conclusion, the additional robustness tests provide the same conclusion as the 
tabulated results: There is no evidence that auditors are willing to impair their independence over 
fees received from their clients. 
 
VI. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND FURTHER DISCUSSION 
In theory, it could be the case that auditors always have their independence impaired 
regardless of the level of fees or risk. In this case it would not be possible to detect a difference 
by conditioning on fees. However, we believe it would be hard to argue that auditors’ 
independence is always impaired.21 If this were the case, there would be little (if any) demand for 
auditors’ services. We know, however, that there is a demand for audit services around the world 
(both mandated by governments and voluntarily demanded as means to reduce agency costs) and 
the literature has provided ample evidence that external audits are valuable in a variety of 
settings around the world (e.g., Simunic and Stein 1987; Abdel-Khalik and Solomon 1988; 
Becker et al. 1998; Fan and Wong 2005; Boone et al. 2008; Haw et al. 2008; Hope et al. 2009b).  
A second possibility is that the audit report has no value (and thus there is no point in 
examining audit opinion modifications). With respect to the usefulness of the audit report in the 
Norwegian context, audit report accuracy is also important. For example, did the auditor fail to 
issue a going concern opinion when there is a subsequent business failure and a clean opinion 
when there is no subsequent business failure? Eilifsen and Gjesdal (2001) report that the fraction 
of bankrupt companies receiving going concern modifications in Norway (62%) is comparable to 
or higher than figures reported in U.S. studies (i.e., Hopwood et al. (1994) and Venuti (2004) 
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 In Section V we report that we ran our tests separately for clients of Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors. We do not 
observe any differences between these groups. As an additional sensitivity check, we form four size portfolios 
(using TA) for each subset of Big 4 and non Big 4 clients and rerun our tests. Again, we observe no differences 
between the groups. Perhaps most important, it is less likely that international audit firms auditing relatively large 
clients consistently are impaired (compared to national or local audit firms auditing smaller firms).  
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report rates between 40-50%). Furthermore, Lensberg et al. (2006) find that the most significant 
variable for predicting bankruptcy among Norwegian firms is the prior auditor opinion. These 
studies thus provide support for the information value of the auditor’s report in Norway and do 
not support the alternative view that auditors’ independence is always impaired and/or that 
auditors have low abilities to detect bankruptcy candidates. 
Since reputation risk and the expected costs of lawsuits are (at least partially) “controlled 
for” in our setting, it is likely that other factors explain our findings. Although it is difficult to 
ascribe the results to a single factor, our findings are certainly consistent with auditors behaving 
with ethics and integrity in mind. Codes of ethics such as those used by the International 
Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the Norwegian Institute of Public Accountants, the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, and 
others are designed to motivate members to operate in an ethical manner. Specifically, Section 
100.4 of the Code of Ethics promulgated by The International Ethics Standards Board for 
Accountants (which is under the auspices of IFAC) requires public accountants to adhere to five 
fundamental principles: Integrity, Objectivity, Professional Competence and Due Care, 
Confidentiality, and Professional Behavior.22 
We find that neither audit nor non-audit fees relate negatively to the probability of audit 
opinion modifications. Although some authors argue that objectivity can be impaired based on 
both audit fees and non-audit fees, regulators have recently put more emphasis on non-audit fees 
and in particular restricted the provision of such services to audit clients. Our research does not 
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 In a survey conducted among 400 professional auditors in Canada, Libby and Thorne (2003) found that integrity, 
truthfulness, and independence received perfect or near perfect ratings across the entire group of respondents. The 
authors conclude that virtue plays an integral role in both the intention to exercise professional judgment and in the 
exercise of professional judgment. Similar inferences can be drawn from a U.S. study by Ahadiat and Mackie (1993) 
and from an experimental study by Falk et al. (1999). For an example of more theoretical work, see for instance 
Shapiro (1986) who models the value of occupational licensing (such as the certification of auditors). He argues and 
finds that, by raising professionals’ training levels, licensing helps alleviate moral hazard problems associated with 
the provision of high quality services. 
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speak directly to whether such prohibitions are warranted or not; at a minimum we can conclude 
that non-audit fees per se do not seem to imply a lower likelihood of issuing modified opinions. 
Other researchers have specifically examined the effects of non-audit services by auditors. 
According to this line of research, there is at least a potential for such services to have a positive 
effect on the quality of the audit work. For example, Simunic (1984) models the relation between 
audit and non-audit fees and empirically demonstrates that knowledge spillovers exist between 
audit and non-audit tasks. Joe and Vandervelde (2007) conduct an experimental study and show 
that auditor-provided non-audit services can be beneficial in that knowledge transfer aids risk 
assessments. Similarly, Gleason and Mills (2007) find that a specific type of non-audit service, 
tax services (which is commonly provided to private firm clients), actually improves the quality 
of the audit work.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The audit report communicates the auditor’s findings to outsiders and plays a crucial role 
in warning financial statement users of impending problems with the firm’s financial reporting or 
internal controls, including going concern problems. However, for the audit opinion to play a 
credible role as a warning signal, the auditor must be able to objectively evaluate firm 
performance and withstand any client pressure to issue a clean opinion. More generally, auditor 
independence is recognized as one of the central values or ideals that underlie the work and 
legitimacy of public accountants (e.g., Levitt 2000). 
Although there is mixed evidence in prior research, it would be hard to argue based on 
the weight of the evidence in recent studies that there is compelling evidence that auditors 
systematically impair their independence. However, most of this research has been conducted in 
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the U.S. (or similar countries) and researchers have appealed to either risk of litigation or loss of 
reputation as explanations for not finding evidence of independence impairment. The purpose of 
this study is to create a “perfect storm” so that the factors that constrain auditors’ behavior are 
less important (or non-existent). Specifically, we examine auditor independence in a private firm 
setting, and prior research has unanimously concluded that reputation risk is considerably lower 
for auditors for private than for public client firms. In addition, we choose an environment 
characterized by low litigation risk for auditors (Norway). Finally, we exclude the most 
extremely financially distressed firms as auditors would not be likely to avoid issuing going 
concern opinions for such firms. These three choices imply that we selected our sample with the 
idea of “giving independence impairment its best chance of success.” 
Using a large sample of private firms in Norway, we test whether (large) audit and non-
audit fees are associated with a lower incidence of going concern audit opinions as well as other 
audit opinion modifications. In contrast to concerns raised by media and regulators, our results 
suggest that auditors are not willing to forego their independence by issuing fewer going concern 
opinions or other modified audit opinions when they receive (large) fees from their clients. These 
results are robust to the inclusion of a large number of control variables, to controlling for the 
expected amount of fees, to using different samples, and to numerous other sensitivity analyses. 
Since our setting to a large extent “controls” for the effects of litigation risk and reputation loss, 
we conclude that something deeper and more fundamental must be going on. Although it is 
difficult to ascribe the results to a single factor, our results are certainly consistent with auditors 
adhering to professional ethics and integrity in fulfilling their duties.  
We can of course never rule out the possibility that we have not controlled for factors that 
could impact the relation between fees and the propensity to issue modified audit opinions. 
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However, given the extensive set of control variables included in our models, the control for the 
expected portion of fees, and the use of both association and changes tests, we do not consider 
the possibility of omitted variables a serious threat to our conclusions. 
32 
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Appendix: List of Variables 
  
ABAF = Abnormal audit fee in year t, estimated as the residuals from the model with LNAF as 
dependent variable in Table 4. 
ABNAF = Abnormal non audit fee in year t, estimated as the residuals from the model with 
LNNAF as dependent variable in Table 4. 
ABTF = Abnormal total fee in year t, estimated as the residuals from the model with LNTF as 
dependent variable in Table 4. 
ACQUISITIONS = 1 if firm has increased long term investments in other companies from t-1 to t, 0 
otherwise. 
AF = Audit fee = Total fee paid to auditor for auditing services in year t in NOK 1,000. 
AGE = Firm’s age in years in year t.  
BIG4 = 1 if auditing firm is a one of the BIG 4 auditing firms or their forerunners in year t, 0 
otherwise.  
ChABAF = Change in abnormal audit fee from t-1 to t = ABAFt - ABAFt-1. 
ChABNAF = Change in abnormal non audit fee from t-1 to t = ABNAFt - ABNAFt-1. 
ChABTF = Change in abnormal total fee from t-1 to t = ABTFt - ABTFt-1. 
ChAUD = 1 if firm changed auditor from t-1 to t, 0 otherwise.  
ChCLAR1 = Change in clarification (CLAR) from t-1 to t = 1 in year t if the firm did not receive a 
modification in year t-1 but did in year t, 0 otherwise. 
ChCLAR2 = Change in clarification (CLAR) from t to t+1 = 1 in year t if the firm did not receive a 
modification in year t but did in year t+1, 0 otherwise. 
ChGC1 = Change in going concern modification (GC) from t-1 to t = 1 in year t if the firm did 
not receive a going concern modification in year t-1 but did in year t, 0 otherwise.  
ChGC2 = Change in going concern modification (GC) from t to t+1 = 1 in year t if firm did not 
receive a going concern modification in year t but did in year t+1, 0 otherwise.  
ChINVESTMENTS = Change in investments from t-1 to t = INVESTMENTSt - INVESTMENTSt-1. 
ChLEV = Change in leverage from t-1 to t = LEVt - LEVt-1. 
ChLNAF = Change in the natural logarithms of audit fee from t-1 to t = LNAFt - LNAFt-1.  
ChLNNAF = Change in the natural logarithms of non audit fee from t-1 to t = LNNAFt - LNNAFt-1.  
ChLNTF = Change in the natural logarithms of total fee from t-1 to t = LNTFt - LNTFt-1.  
ChLOSS = 1 if firm went from profit in year t-1 to loss in year t, e.g. ChLOSSt = 1 if LOSSt-1 = 0 
and LOSSt = 1, 0 otherwise.  
ChOPCF = Change in operating cash flow from t-1 to t = OPCFt - OPCFt-1. 
ChPROBANK = Change in the probability of going bankrupt from t-1 to t = PROBANKt - PROBANKt-1. 
ChRES1 = Change in reservation (RES) from t-1 to t = 1 in year t if the firm did not receive a 
reservation in year t-1 but did in year t, 0 otherwise. 
ChRES2 = Change in reservation (RES) from t to t+1 = 1 in year t if the firm did not receive a 
modification in year t but did in year t+1, 0 otherwise. 
ChTA = Change in natural logarithms of total assets from t-1 to t = LNTAt - LNTAt-1. 
ChUNA1 = Change in unable to issue an opinion (UNA) from t-1 to t = 1 in year t if the firm did 
not receive a audit report where the auditor states he/she is unable to issue an opinion 
in year t-1 but did in year t, 0 otherwise. 
ChUNA2 = Change in unable to issue an opinion (UNA) from t to t+1 = 1 in year t if the firm did 
not receive a audit report where the auditor states he/she is unable to issue an opinion 
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in year t but did in year t+1, 0 otherwise. 
CLAR  = 1 for firms receiving audit report with clarification (i.e. clean (or unqualified) audit 
report with emphasis of matter) in year t, 0 otherwise. 
CLEAN  = 1 for firms receiving audit report with no modifications (neither emphasis of matter, 
modifications nor other deviations from a clean report) in year t, 0 otherwise.  
CURRATIO = Current ratio at the end of year t. 
DECPIC = 1 if firm decreased share capital from t-1 to t, 0 otherwise.  
EMPLOY = Number of employees in year t.  
EXIT = 1 if firm is included in the sample in year t, but not in years t+1 or t+2. 
FOREIGN = Percentage of foreign subsidiaries in year t = the number of foreign subsidiaries in year 
t * 100 / total number of subsidiaries in year t. 
FUTINCPIC = Future increases in share capital = 1 if share capital increased in year t+1, 0 otherwise.  
FUTNEWDEBT = Future increases in interest bearing debt = 1 if firm obtained long term or short term 
interest bearing debt in year t+1, 0 otherwise.  
FYE = 1 for fiscal years ending other than Dec. 31 in year t, 0 otherwise. 
GC = 1 if the firm received a going concern modification only in year t, 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, GCPY = 1 if the firm received a going concern modification in the previous 
year, 0 otherwise. 
GROWTH = Change in sales in year t = (SALESt - SALESt-1) / SALESt-1. 
GAAP = 1 if firm uses regular Norwegian accounting principles in year t, 0 if firm uses the 
simplified set of accounting principles that is available for small companies.  
INCPIC = 1 if firm increased share capital from t-1 to t, 0 otherwise. 
IND  = Industry affiliation (two digit industry codes) 
INDSPEC = Auditor industry specialization in year t = number of clients the firms auditor has in 
industry j in year t / total number of clients for all auditing firms in industry j in year t. 
Two digits industry codes were used to calculate INDSPEC. The sample used to 
compute INDSPEC consists of all firms in 2001-2002 with available information on 
industry affiliation and auditor identification (245,901 observations). 
INTANG = Intangible assets / total assets, both at the end of year t.  
INVESTMENTS = (Long and short term investments in securities + bank deposits + cash) / total assets, 
both at the end of year t.  
INVREC = Inventory and accounts receivable at the end of year t scaled by SALESt.  
LEV = Long and short-term interest bearing debt / total assets at year end, both at the end of 
year t. Short-term interest bearing debt = total short term debt - accounts payable - 
dividends - taxes payable – VAT and social service taxes - other short term debt.  
LNEMPLOY = Natural logarithm of 1+ number of employees = ln(1 + EMPLOYt). 
LNSALES = Natural logarithm of total revenue from operations  = ln(SALESt). 
LNSUB = Natural logarithm of 1 + number of subsidiaries = ln(1 + NOSUBt). 
LOSS = 1 if net income after taxes before extraordinary item and taxes on extraordinary item < 
0 in year t, 0 otherwise.  
NAF = Non audit fee = Total fee paid to auditor for non-auditing services in year t in NOK 
1,000.  
NEWDEBT = Increase in interest bearing debt in year t = 1 firm obtained long term or short term 
interest bearing debt in year t, 0 otherwise. 
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NOIND = Number of two digit industry codes the firm is registered with in year t. 
NOSUBS = Number of subsidiaries in year t.  
OPCF = Operating cash flow in year t scaled by SALESt. Operating cash flow = earnings - total 
accruals. Earnings = net income after taxes before extraordinary item and taxes on 
extraordinary items. Total accruals = change in current assets - change in cash - change 
in short term debt + change in short term interest bearing debt + change in dividends + 
depreciation + amortization - change in net deferred taxes. 
PROBANK = Probability of going bankrupt, estimated using Model 1 in Ohlson (1980). 
RES  = 1 for firms receiving audit report with reservation in year t, 0 otherwise.   
ROA = Return on assets = Net income before taxes and extraordinary items in year t scaled by 
(TAt-1 + TAt) * 0.5  
SALES = Total revenue from operating activities in year t in NOK 1,000.  
TA = Total assets at the end of year t in NOK 1,000.  
TF = Total fee = Total fee paid to auditor for audit and non audit services in year t in NOK 
1,000 (e.g. TFt = AFt + NAFt). 
UNA  = 1 for firms receiving audit report where auditor states that he/she is unable to issue an 
opinion in year t, 0 otherwise.  
UNITEMS = Dummy for unusual items in year t = 1 for firms with impairments or extraordinary 
items in year t, 0 otherwise.  
YRt = 1 if observations belong to year t, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
 
Please note further that “LN” denotes the natural logarithm.
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Table 1: Sample Size and Sample Selection Criteria 
 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 All-years 
Number of private limited liability companies 110,694 118,359 126,335 130,300 135,562 138,176 140,625 141,502 143,965 138,470 1,323,988 
Exclusion criteria            
Sales < 1 mill NOK 49,501 52,701 56,475 58,199 60,761 61,565 62,751 61,853 60,871 61,149 585,826 
Total Assets < 1 mill NOK 15,374 15,564 16,103 15,668 15,524 15,282 15,521 16,079 16,239 14,027 155,381 
Total auditor remuneration < 10 000 NOK 10,832 11,556 11,619 10,955 10,348 10,207 9,135 8,680 8,755 12,815 104,902 
Firm age, industry affiliation, number of employees, audit 
report or prior year’s financial statement not available 1,529 1,876 2,151 2,302 13,428 3,458 6,326 3,284 3,571 2,379 40,304 
Financial institutions 328 381 425 502 446 464 467 445 462 479 4,399 
  No of observations in 1996-2005 33,130 36,281 39,562 42,674 35,055 47,200 46,425 51,161 54,067 47,621 433,176 
Information on audit and non audit fee not available 33,130 0 0 0 0 0 0 51,161 54,067 47,621 185,979 
Firms with non audit fee = 0 - 19,399 20,260 16,923 12,711 17,030 16,198 - - - 102,521 
Firms with other than going concern modifications - 2,151 2,365 2,483 1,498 3,266 3,015 - - - 14,778 
Firms not in the sample the following two years - 960 1,144 1,759 1,473 1,977 1,740 - - - 9,053 
The 60 % of firms with lowest probability of going 
bankrupt - 8,263 9,476 12,905 11,624 14,956 15,283 - - - 72,507 
The 5% of firms with highest probability of going bankrupt - 689 790 1,075 969 1,246 1,274 - - - 6,042 
  No of financially distressed firms in 1997-2002  - 4,820 5,528 7,528 6,781 8,724 8,915 - - - 42,296 
Information missing on auditor, auditor change, auditor 
industry specialization, and number of subsidiaries - 4,820 5,528 7,528 6,781 246 3 - - - 24,906 
  No of financially distressed firms in 2001-2002  - - - - - 8,478 8,912 - - - 17,390 
 
Notes to Table 1 
The table shows sample size and sample selection criteria. Firms are defined as financially distressed if they do not belong to the 60 % (5 %) of firms with the lowest (highest) 
probabilities of going bankrupt. The probability of going bankrupt is estimated using Model 1 in Ohlson (1980), which predicts bankruptcy within one year.   
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Table  2: Distributions of Contents of Audit Reports and Firms Not Included in 
Sample in t+1 or t+2 
 
    Percentage of firms in each group with   
Group N CLEAN GC CLAR RES NEG UNA EXIT 
1 7,238 96.0 % 0.1 % 3.6 % 0.3 % 0.2 % 0.0 % 9.1 % 
2 7,233 95.9 % 0.1 % 3.7 % 0.3 % 0.3 % 0.0 % 5.5 % 
3 7,234 95.5 % 0.1 % 4.1 % 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.0 % 5.0 % 
4 7,233 95.5 % 0.1 % 4.1 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.0 % 4.4 % 
5 7,233 95.0 % 0.1 % 4.6 % 0.3 % 0.3 % 0.0 % 4.6 % 
6 7,235 94.5 % 0.1 % 5.0 % 0.3 % 0.4 % 0.0 % 4.5 % 
7 7,233 94.6 % 0.3 % 5.0 % 0.3 % 0.3 % 0.0 % 4.4 % 
8 7,233 93.2 % 0.4 % 6.1 % 0.5 % 0.5 % 0.0 % 4.9 % 
9 7,234 92.3 % 0.8 % 7.0 % 0.6 % 0.5 % 0.0 % 5.2 % 
10 7,233 91.6 % 1.0 % 7.7 % 0.5 % 0.5 % 0.0 % 5.6 % 
11 7,237 90.1 % 2.0 % 8.9 % 0.6 % 0.7 % 0.0 % 5.6 % 
12 7,233 87.7 % 2.6 % 11.4 % 0.7 % 0.8 % 0.0 % 6.1 % 
13 7,234 86.9 % 3.2 % 12.2 % 0.7 % 0.8 % 0.0 % 6.4 % 
14 7,232 84.6 % 4.6 % 14.4 % 1.0 % 1.0 % 0.0 % 6.3 % 
15 7,235 81.5 % 5.6 % 17.1 % 1.5 % 1.4 % 0.0 % 7.8 % 
16 7,233 77.7 % 7.6 % 21.0 % 1.5 % 1.6 % 0.1 % 8.8 % 
17 7,234 73.7 % 9.6 % 24.6 % 1.8 % 1.9 % 0.1 % 10.8 % 
18 7,233 67.2 % 13.8 % 31.0 % 2.1 % 2.5 % 0.1 % 11.5 % 
19 7,234 57.6 % 20.9 % 40.4 % 2.6 % 3.2 % 0.1 % 15.2 % 
20 7,232 32.1 % 39.7 % 64.9 % 5.3 % 5.3 % 0.2 % 24.7 % 
Total 144,676 84.2 % 5.6 % 14.8 % 1.1 % 1.1 % 0.0 % 7.8 % 
 
Notes to Table 2 
The sample (N=144,676) consists of all firms in 1997-2002 (N= 433,176) less firms with missing information on audit 
and non-audit fees (N = 185,979) or firms with non-audit fee = 0 (N=102,521). The firms are grouped into 20 equal 
sized portfolios based on the probability of going bankrupt as estimated using Model 1 in Ohlson (1980). Firms with 
lowest (highest) probabilities of going bankrupt are found in group 1 (20).  CLEAN = Audit report with no 
modifications. GC = Audit report with going concern modification only. CLAR = Audit report with clarification. RES = 
Audit report with reservation. NEG = Audit report with negative conclusion. UNA = Audit report where auditor states 
that he/she is unable to issue an opinion. EXIT shows the percentage of firms in each group in year t that does not meet 
sample selection criteria in t+1 or t+2. 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Variables in Abnormal Fee Models and Going 
Concern Models 
 
  N Mean St.dev Q1 Median Q3 
Panel A: 1997-2002       
GC 42,296 0.08 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 
TF 42,296 45.28 78.96 20.00 30.00 48.00 
AF 42,296 28.23 34.91 13.00 20.00 31.00 
NAF 42,296 18.06 60.90 6.00 10.00 18.00 
SALES 42,296 21,485 67,011 3,815 7,919 18,004 
TA 42,296 15,244 67,013 2,298 4,780 11,763 
EMPLOY 42,296 14.41 50.50 3.00 6.00 14.00 
AGE 42,296 12.69 12.01 5.00 10.00 15.00 
ROA 42,296 0.02 0.12 -0.03 0.02 0.08 
GROWTH 42,296 0.34 1.27 -0.05 0.06 0.22 
LEV 42,296 0.49 0.26 0.28 0.51 0.70 
ChLEV 42,296 0.00 0.17 -0.06 0.00 0.07 
OPCF 42,296 0.02 0.88 -0.03 0.02 0.08 
LOSS 42,296 0.37 0.48 0 0 1 
INVESTMENTS 42,296 0.15 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.21 
INVREC 42,296 0.21 0.30 0.07 0.16 0.27 
ACQUISITIONS 42,296 0.17 0.38 0 0 0 
INTANG 42,296 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.01 
UNITEMS 42,296 0.05 0.22 0 0 0 
GAAP 42,296 0.10 0.30 0 0 0 
INCPIC 42,296 0.09 0.29 0 0 0 
DECPIC 42,296 0.09 0.28 0 0 0 
NEWDEBT 42,296 0.25 0.43 0 0 0 
CURRATIO 42,296 1.34 1.20 0.90 1.12 1.42 
NOIND 42,296 1.64 0.92 1 1 2 
FYE 42,296 0.01 0.10 0 0 0 
FUTINCPIC 42,296 0.12 0.33 0 0 0 
FUTNEWDEBT 42,296 0.23 0.42 0 0 0 
 
Panel B: 2001-2002 
 
     
BIG4 17,390 0.29 0.45 0 0 1 
ChAUD 17,390 0.16 0.36 0 0 0 
INDSPEC 17,390 2.08 3.08 0.16 0.42 4.05 
NOSUBS 17,390 0.38 1.32 0 0 0 
FOREIGN 17,390 1.43 10.99 0 0 0 
 
Notes to Table 3 
The table shows descriptive statistics for variables used in the abnormal fee models and/or the going concern models 
(in the models we use natural logarithms, indicated by the prefix LN, of some of the variables). As described in the text, 
we report results for two sample periods: 1997-2002 (Panel A) and 2001-2002 (Panel B). The main reason for using 
two sample periods is that data for some potentially important control variables only are available for the more limited 
time period (see Panel B). The sample consists of financially distressed firms as defined in Table 1. N = number of 
observations. Q1 and Q3 are the 25th percentile and 75th percentile, respectively.  Please see appendix for variable 
definitions. 
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Table 4: OLS Estimation of Abnormal Total Fees, Abnormal Audit Fees, and 
Abnormal Non Audit Fee 
 
Panel A: 1997-2002 (N=42,296) 
Dep.var. LNTF   LNAF   LNNAF 
  Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value 
LNSALES 0.283*** 75.84  0.289 *** 80.11  0.234 *** 43.32
LNEMPLOY 0.112*** 27.84  0.133 *** 33.62  0.067 *** 11.61
ChLEV 0.011  0.69  -0.013   -0.87  0.048 ** 2.03
INVESTMENTS 0.174*** 10.34  0.092 *** 5.53  0.266 *** 11.51
INVREC 0.119*** 7.09  0.121 *** 7.28  0.108 *** 5.71
GROWTH -0.002  -0.69  -0.014 *** -5.72  0.013 *** 3.82
ROA -0.580*** -25.22  -0.531 *** -23.88  -0.574 *** -17.43
ACQUISITIONS 0.103*** 15.17  0.080 *** 12.12  0.121 *** 12.10
INTANG 0.384*** 10.64  0.261 *** 7.73  0.542 *** 9.93
UNITEMS 0.143*** 11.97  0.105 *** 9.52  0.174 *** 9.59
GAAP 0.221*** 19.86  0.168 *** 16.33  0.261 *** 15.86
INCPIC 0.103*** 11.62  0.052 *** 6.10  0.171 *** 12.90
DECPIC 0.139*** 14.81  0.075 *** 8.44  0.209 *** 14.97
NEWDEBT 0.020*** 3.22  0.014 ** 2.32  0.019 ** 2.12
CURRATIO -0.001  -0.38  -0.003   -1.46  0.001   0.34
NOIND 0.043*** 15.63  0.037 *** 13.83  0.045 *** 11.06
FYE 0.274*** 10.10  0.252 *** 8.98  0.310 *** 8.20
Adjusted R2 51.6 %       53.8 %       27.7 %     
            
Panel B: 2001-2002 (N=17,390) 
Dep.var. LNTF   LNAF   LNNAF 
  Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value   Coeff. t-value
LNSALES 0.263*** 45.13 0.274 *** 48.07 0.21*** 25.35
LNEMPLOY 0.109*** 17.81 0.133 *** 21.56 0.061*** 6.95
ChLEV 0.049*  1.74 0.009  0.32 0.106*** 2.64
INVESTMENTS 0.15*** 6.08 0.087 *** 3.59 0.219*** 6.53
INVREC 0.101*** 4.70 0.097 *** 4.65 0.098*** 3.71
GROWTH -0.006  -1.56 -0.012 *** -3.18 0.003  0.53
ROA -0.547*** -15.23 -0.514 *** -15.06 -0.51*** -9.97
ACQUISITIONS 0.066*** 6.04 0.053 *** 4.94 0.075*** 4.73
INTANG 0.402*** 7.61 0.328 *** 6.59 0.483*** 6.04
UNITEMS 0.16*** 8.21 0.115 *** 6.28 0.186*** 6.28
GAAP 0.194*** 11.29 0.155 *** 9.54 0.215*** 8.47
INCPIC 0.099*** 7.18 0.034 *** 2.59 0.182*** 9.06
DECPIC 0.126*** 9.71 0.065 *** 5.21 0.196*** 10.44
NEWDEBT 0.018** 1.97 0.011  1.19 0.023*  1.73
BIG4 0.126*** 6.84 0.095 *** 5.42 0.139*** 4.33
INDSPEC 0.003  1.18 -0.002  -0.84 0.015*** 2.95
CURRATIO -0.006*  -1.73 -0.006 *  -1.79 -0.005  -1.17
LNSUB 0.157*** 13.90 0.096 *** 8.93 0.213*** 12.96
FOREIGN 0.001*  1.76 0.001 *  1.83 0.001  1.22
NOIND 0.043*** 9.73 0.037 *** 8.23 0.045*** 7.05
FYE 0.289*** 6.96 0.266 *** 6.44 0.339*** 5.45
Adjusted R2 53.2 %    53.7 %    31.3 %  
 
Notes to Table 4 
This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimated coefficients (Coeff.) and corresponding t-values for the 
abnormal fee models estimated on the 1997-2002 (Panel A) and 2001-2002 (Panel B) samples described in Table 1. 
Two-digit industry indicator variables and year indicator variables are included in the models but not tabulated. 
Reported significance levels (*, **, and *** for 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively) are for two-sided tests and 
based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Please see appendix for variable definitions.  
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Table 5: Logit Regressions of the Propensity to Issue Going Concern Modifications on Fees 
(Abnormal and Raw Total Fees, Audit Fees, and Non-Audit Fees) and Control Variables 
 
Panel A1:  1997-2002 (N=42,296) 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  Model 4 
  Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value 
ABTF 0.079 1.62            
ABAF     0.055  1.11     0.040  0.77
ABNAF         0.040  1.19 0.031  0.89
LNTA -0.333*** -13.35 -0.329*** -13.30 -0.331*** -13.24 -0.332*** -13.30
LNAGE -0.231*** -6.88 -0.229*** -6.82 -0.228*** -6.81 -0.230*** -6.85
LEV 2.856*** 23.64 2.857*** 23.64 2.859*** 23.68 2.857*** 23.64
ChLEV -0.431*** -2.78 -0.432*** -2.79 -0.434*** -2.80 -0.432*** -2.79
OPCF 0.066** 2.07 0.066** 2.06 0.066** 2.08 0.066** 2.07
LOSS 1.146*** 18.84 1.145*** 18.83 1.146*** 18.84 1.145*** 18.84
ROA -3.945*** -14.67 -3.938*** -14.61 -3.941*** -14.53 -3.944*** -14.65
INVESTMENTS -0.028  -0.17 -0.022  -0.14 -0.024  -0.15 -0.026  -0.16
PROBANK 7.184*** 6.37 7.185*** 6.38 7.162*** 6.35 7.181*** 6.37
INCPIC -0.422*** -4.98 -0.421*** -4.98 -0.422*** -4.98 -0.422*** -4.98
NEWDEBT 0.093  1.56 0.093  1.56 0.092  1.55 0.093  1.56
FUTINCPIC 0.463*** 7.30 0.465*** 7.34 0.464*** 7.31 0.464*** 7.30
FUTNEWDEBT 0.122** 2.10 0.122** 2.10 0.123** 2.11 0.122** 2.10
GCPY 3.234*** 55.02 3.236*** 55.08 3.235*** 55.04 3.234*** 55.02
Pesudo R2 38.3 %       38.3 %       38.3 %       38.3 %     
     
Panel A2: Logarithms of raw fee 1997-2002 (N=42,296)     
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  Model 4 
  Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value
LNTF 0.152*** 3.08            
LNAF     0.106** 2.13     0.074 1.42
LNNAF         0.084** 2.51 0.069** 1.95
Pseudo R2 39.8% 39.8% 39.8% 39.8%
 
Panel B1: Abnormal fee, 2001-2002 (N=17,390)     
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  Model 4 
  Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value
ABTF 0.016  0.21            
ABAF     0.01  0.13     0.00  0.04
ABNAF         0.016  0.31 0.02  0.28
LNTA -0.322*** -8.29 -0.322*** -8.34 -0.323*** -8.29 -0.32*** -8.29
LNAGE -0.266*** -4.89 -0.266*** -4.87 -0.266*** -4.90 -0.27*** -4.88
LEV 2.717*** 15.05 2.718*** 15.05 2.717*** 15.06 2.72*** 15.05
ChLEV -0.394  -1.47 -0.395  -1.47 -0.395  -1.47 -0.40  -1.47
OPCF 0.051  1.13 0.05  1.13 0.051  1.13 0.05  1.13
LOSS 1.235*** 12.75 1.235*** 12.75 1.235*** 12.76 1.24*** 12.75
ROA -3.566*** -9.02 -3.564*** -9.01 -3.566*** -9.01 -3.57*** -9.02
INVESTMENTS -0.407  -1.55 -0.405  -1.54 -0.409  -1.55 -0.41  -1.55
PROBANK 5.593*** 2.98 5.597*** 2.98 5.584*** 2.98 5.59*** 2.98
INCPIC -0.257** -1.98 -0.257** -1.98 -0.257** -1.99 -0.26** -1.99
NEWDEBT -0.038  -0.45 -0.038  -0.45 -0.038  -0.45 -0.04  -0.45
FUTINCPIC 0.39*** 4.25 0.391*** 4.25 0.39*** 4.24 0.39*** 4.24
FUTNEWDEBT 0.059  0.65 0.059  0.65 0.059  0.64 0.06  0.64
BIG4 -0.094  -1.17 -0.094  -1.17 -0.094  -1.17 -0.09  -1.17
ChAUD -0.01  -0.10 -0.01  -0.10 -0.01  -0.11 -0.01  -0.11
GCPY 3.523*** 36.10 3.523*** 36.10 3.522*** 36.10 3.52*** 36.09
Pesudo R2 38.0 %     38.0 %     38.0 %     38.0 %   
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Panel B2: Logarithms of raw fee 2001-2002      
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  Model 4 
  Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value
LNTF 0.078 1.05            
LNAF     0.061 0.79     0.042 0.52
LNNAF         0.049 0.96 0.040 0.74
Pseudo R2 39.4% 39.4% 39.4% 39.4%
 
 
 
Notes to Table 5 
This table reports Logit estimated coefficients (Coeff.) and corresponding z-values for the going concern models 
estimated on the 1997-2002 (Panel A1 and A2) and 2001-2002 (Panel B1 and B2) samples described in Table 1.  
Panels A1 and B1 uses abnormal fees (ABTF, ABAF, and ABNAF) as test variables and the abnormal fees are computed 
as the results from the models estimated in Table 4. Two-digit industry indicator variables and year indicator variables 
are included in all models but not tabulated. Panels A2 and B2 uses natural logarithms of raw fees (LNTF, LNAF, and 
LNNAF) as test variables. The control variables in Panel A2 (B2) are the variables from the fee model in Table 4 Panel 
A (B) in addition to the control variables shown in Table 5 Panel A1 (B1). Reported significance levels (*, **, and *** 
for 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively) are for two-sided tests and based on robust standard errors clustered at the 
firm level. Please see appendix for variable definitions. 
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Table 6: Changes Specifications of Logit Regressions on the Propensity to Issue Going 
Concern Modifications 
 
Panels A and B: Logit Regressions on the Propensity to Issue Going Concern Modifications 
on Changes in Abnormal Total Fees (ChABTF), Changes in Abnormal Audit Fees 
(ChABAF), Changes in Abnormal Non Audit Fees (ChABNAF) and Changes in Control 
Variables 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable is Change From No Going Concern Modification in t-1 to Going 
Concern Modification in t (= ChGC1).  
Panel A1: Sample period 1998-2002. N=29,029 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  Model 4 
  Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value 
ChABTF 0.073  0.86             
ChABAF     -0.062   -0.80      -0.053  -0.69 
ChABNAF         0.055 * 1.74  0.053* 1.68 
                
Panel A1: Sample period 2001-2002. N = 12,874 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  Model 4 
  Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value 
ChABTF 0.144  1.23             
ChABAF     -0.027   -0.24      -0.022  -0.20 
ChABNAF         0.083 * 1.80  0.083* 1.80 
                
Panel B: Dependent Variable is Change From No Going Concern Modification in t to Going Concern 
Modification in t+1 (= ChGC2).  
Panel B1: Sample period 1998-2002.  N=29,029 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  Model 4 
  Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value 
ChABTF 0.201*** 2.58             
ChABAF     0.045   0.59      0.053  0.70 
ChABNAF         0.041  1.36  0.043  1.41 
                
Panel B2: Sample period: 2001-2002. N=12,874 
  Model 1   Model 2   Model 3  Model 4 
  Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value   Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value 
ChABTF 0.183*  1.67             
ChABAF     0.142   1.33      0.142  1.32 
ChABNAF         -0.012  -0.25  -0.011  -0.23 
 
 
Panel C: Logit Regressions on the Propensity to Issue Going Concern Modifications on Changes in 
Logarithms of Raw Audit Fees (ChLNAF), Changes in Logarithms of Raw Non Audit Fees 
(ChLNNAF) and Changes in Control Variables 
 1998-2002 (N=29,029)  2001-2002 (N=13,302) 
Test var. ChLNAF  ChLNNAF  ChLNAF  ChLNNAF 
Dep.var.: Coeff.  z-value Coeff.  z-value   Coeff.  z-value  Coeff.  z-value 
ChGC1 -0.034   -0.43  0.039   1.23  0.041   0.38  0.702   1.5 
ChGC2 0.024   0.31  0.036   1.19  0.134   1.28  -0.003   -0.07 
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Notes to Table 6 
This table reports coefficients (Coeff.) and z-values for change specifications of models 1, 2, 3, and 4 in Table 5. 
Model 1 shows results from changes in abnormal total fees (ChABTF), model 2 shows results from changes in 
abnormal audit fees (ChABAF), model 3 shows results from changes in abnormal non audit fees (ChABNAF), and 
model 4 shows results for changes in abnormal audit fees (ChABAF) and changes in abnormal non-audit fees 
(ChABNAF). Change in abnormal fees is calculated as ChABFEE = ABFEEt - ABFEEt-1, where ABFEE is abnormal 
total fee (ABTF), audit fee (ABAF) or non-audit fee (ABNAF) estimated using the residuals from the models in Table 4. 
Panel C reports similar results using changes in raw fees. Reported significance levels (*, **, and *** for 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels, respectively) are for two-sided tests and based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Please see appendix for variable definitions. 
 
In Panel A1, the coefficients and z-values for the changes in fee variables are obtained from four versions of the 
following model estimated for the time period 1998-2002 (year fixed effects included but not reported): 
 
ChGC1 = α0 + α1ChABFEE + α2ChTA + α3ChLEV + α4ChOPCF + α5ChLOSS + α6ROA + 
   α7ChINVESTMENTS + α8ChPROBANK + α9INCPIC + α10FUTINCPIC + α11NEWDEBT +  
   α12FUTNEWDEBT + υ 
ChGC1 is change in opinion from t-1 to t, defined as no going concern modification in year t-1 and a going concern 
modification in year t. In Panel A2 the sample period is 2001-2002 and the models used in Panel A1 are augmented 
with ChAUD as independent variable. The models in Panel B1 and B2 are similar to the models in Panel A1 and A2 
except that the dependent variable is ChGC2. ChGC2 is change in opinion from t to t+1, defined as no going concern 
modification in period t and a going concern modification in t+1.  
 
Panel C reports results from change specifications of the models in panels A2 and B2 in Table 5. The change model is 
identical to model 4 in Panel A1 and B1 in Table 6.  
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Table 7: Additional Tests 
 
 
Panel A: Logit Regressions of the Propensity to Issue Going Concern Modifications on Abnormal 
Total Fees and Control Variables for Financially Distressed Firms in 2003-2005 
    Coff   z-value   Pesudo R2   N 
ABTF   0.063   1.30   38.4 %   48,142 
 
 
Panel B: Logit Regressions on the Propensity to Issue Modified Opinions Other Than Going 
Concern Modifications on Abnormal Audit Fees, Abnormal Non Audit Fees, and Control 
Variables. Sample Period: 1998-2002 
Sample consists of firms with: 
  
Clean opinions or 
clarifications only  
Clean opinions or 
reservations only  
Clean opinion or unable to 
issue an opinion only 
Dep. var.:  CLAR  RES  UNA 
 Test var.:  Coeff.   z-value  Coeff.   z-value  Coeff.   z-value 
 ABAF  0.097** 2.41  0.055   0.45  0.140  0.85 
 ABNAF  -0.004   -0.13  0.057  0.71  0.116   1.15 
             
N   84,004   78,990   79,646 
             
Panel C: Logit Regressions on the Propensity to Issue Modified Opinions Other Than Going 
Concern Modifications on Changes in Abnormal Audit Fees (ChABAF), Changes in Abnormal 
Non Audit Fees (ChABAF) and Changes in Control Variables. Sample period: 1998-2002 
Panel C1: Changes in Opinion Defined as No Modified Opinion in t-1 and a Modified Opinion in t. 
Sample: Firms with: 
  
Clean opinions or 
clarifications only  
Clean opinions or 
reservations only  
Clean opinion or unable to 
issue an opinion only 
Dep.var.:  ChCLAR1  ChRES1  ChUNA1 
Test var.:  Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value 
ChABAF  -0.004  -0.07  0.124  0.74  0.157  0.85 
ChABNAF  0.009  0.01  -0.004  -0.06  0.029  0.45 
             
N  84,004  78,990  79,646 
             
 
Panel C2: Changes in Opinion Defined as No Modified Opinion in t and a Modified Opinion in t+1 
Sample: Firms with: 
  
Clean opinions or 
clarifications only  
Clean opinions or 
reservations only  
Clean opinion or unable to 
issue an opinion only 
Dep.var.:  ChCLAR2  ChRES2  ChUNA2 
Test var.:  Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value  Coeff. z-value 
ChABAF  0.053  1.29  -0.030  -0.21  -0.115  -0.66 
ChABNAF  0.040** 2.57  0.082  1.41  0.002  0.03 
             
N  84,004  78,990  79,646 
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Notes to Table 7 
This table reports estimated coefficients (Coeff.) and z-values for various versions of level and change specifications of 
the opinion models for various subsets of the sample. Only the results for the audit fee and non-audit fee variables from 
Model 4 are presented for brevity. Reported significance levels (*, **, and *** for 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively) are for two-sided tests and based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Please see appendix 
for variable definitions. 
 
Panel A reports results from estimating model 1 in Table 5 for the latter period in which only total fee is available. The 
dependent variable is going concern modifications (GC). The sample consists of financially distressed firms as defined 
in the notes to Table 1 without deleting firms that do not enter the sample in t+1 or t+2 (as no information is available 
after 2005, variables capturing future financing (FUTINCPIC and FUTNEWDEBT) are excluded from the model). 
 
Panel B reports results obtained when the dependent variable in model 4 in Table 5 is either clarification (CLAR), 
reservation (RES), or unable to issue an opinion (UNA), respectively. The sample initially consisted of all firms in the 
1997-2002 period except those that (1) did not meet the sample selection criteria for t+1 or t+2, (2) had probabilities of 
going bankrupt > 95 percentile of PROBANK, and (3) did receive a audit report with a going concern modification or a 
negative conclusion in year t. In order to have comparable samples in Panel B and C, we also deleted observations for 
which changes in abnormal audit (non audit) fees could not be estimated. Finally, for each type of deviation from a 
clean audit report, we only include firms that did not have other forms of audit opinion modifications. 
 
Panel C reports results from change specification of the models used in Panel B. The sample is identical to the sample 
used in Panel B. The independent variables are identical to model 4 specified in the notes to Table 6. The dependent 
variables are ChCLAR1 (ChRES1) [ChUNA1], which are defined as an audit report with no clarification (reservation) 
[unable to issue and opinion] in year t-1 and an audit report with clarification (reservation) [unable to issue and 
opinion] in year t. For ChCLAR2 (ChRES2) [ChUNA2], the change in opinion goes from no modified opinion in t to a 
modified opinion in t+1.  
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